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EMU 2.0 
Normally associated with web 
applications that facilitate interactivity, 
interoperability and user-centred 
design, the label 2.0 could well be 
grafted onto the package of new 
provisions regarding economic 
governance in the euro zone that have 
been approved over the past weeks and 
months or are to be finalised over the 
next ones. Great strides have already 
been made, and more are to come. The 
Union is now completing Maastricht’s 
“unfinished business” and paving the 
way for a new stage of European 
economic integration. 
The EMU construction site is likely to 
remain open for a while, as both the 
hardware and the software required to 
equip the EU for current and future 
challenges have to be constantly 
refined and updated. It is worth noting, 
however, that the implementation of 
most of the provisions that have been 
agreed to date as well as of those that 
are in the pipeline is likely to have a big 
impact on the way in which Member 
States (especially in the euro zone) 
formulate and execute policy at the 
national level. Here lies an apparent 
paradox, as EMU 2.0 may end up 
affecting national “sovereignty” to a 
much bigger extent than any 
conceivable treaty change – including 
the one recently agreed upon at the 
December European Council – while 
most Member State governments 
rhetorically insist on retaining and even 
ring-fencing “sovereignty” vis-à-vis 
possible EU inroads. Yet this 
mismatch is hardly new in the long 
history of European integration and, 
after all, what matters is that policy 
coordination will become, at long last, 
more interdependent and interactive. 
This issue of BEPA Monthly intends 
to take stock of the recent acquis, 
explain what we already have in store, 
and shed some light on what may 
come next. These themes will be at the 
centre of the conference “Towards 
integrated economic governance in the 
EU: The European Semester” that 
BEPA, jointly with DG ECFIN, is 
organising on 12 January 2011. The 
conference will be held at the start of 
the first “European Semester”, kick-
started by the adoption of the Annual 
Growth Survey on the same day. 
We regret that Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa, one of the “founding 
fathers” of the common currency and a 
rare figure of European grand commis, 
suddenly passed away just a few days 
ago. His wisdom, passion and intellect 
– that he was expected to convey also 
on this occasion – will be sorely 
missed. 
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Some fifteen years ago, when European leaders 
negotiated the foundations of the framework of 
EU economic governance, no serious observer 
would have anticipated the type of crisis that 
eventually unfolded at the end of 2008. By the 
mid-1990s the idea of the “Great Moderation” 
had become an integral part of the prevailing 
economic paradigm: the risk of major economic 
and financial dislocations was considered to be 
under control as long as monetary and fiscal 
policy would take a responsible course. The two 
main blocks of EU economic governance – 
centralised monetary policy-making combined 
with common rules for fiscal policy-making – 
reflected this basic understanding. 
The Great Recession has clearly overthrown the 
mainstays of the “Great Moderation”. While it is 
fair to say that the policy responses taken under 
existing rules helped us avert a full-scale 
depression – the European Economic Recovery 
Programme launched at the end of 2008 and the 
rescue package negotiated for Greece being two 
notable examples – the crisis has, without any 
doubt, revealed scope for improving economic 
governance in the EU. 
The Commission’s reform package 
Against this backdrop, on 29 September 2010 
the European Commission adopted a 
comprehensive set of proposals to reform and 
strengthen the EU framework of economic 
governance. The reform package translates the 
lessons of the crisis into concrete legislative 
projects aimed at preventing economic 
instabilities and, ultimately, at protecting 
EU citizens and, in particular, workers and 
taxpayers. 
Concretely, the package comprises six pieces of 
draft legislation which can be divided into two 
pillars: the first relates to fiscal governance, the 
second to broader macroeconomic governance. 
A schematic representation of the reform 
package is provided below in Figure 1. 
Without going too much into detail, the two 
pillars offer concrete responses to weaknesses 
revealed by the crisis. Starting with fiscal 
surveillance, the Great Recession proved – 
unfortunately not for the first time – that 
Member States had not taken advantage of the 
good economic years preceding the downturn to 
create fiscal space. In 2005-2007, important 
revenue windfalls were used to increase spending 
or reduce taxes, just to find out shortly 
afterwards that expenditure levels were not 
sustainable and that there was too little room for 
manoeuvre to react to the crisis. 
To prevent this from happening again in the 
future, the intention under the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) is to keep a closer eye on 
expenditure trends vis-à-vis a sustainable rate of 
medium-term economic growth. This approach 
encapsulates the main intuition of sustainable 
public finances whereby, over the long term, 
government expenditures should not grow faster 
than economic growth unless taxes or other 
revenues are raised. 
Before but especially in the aftermath of the crisis it 
also became apparent that, in view of declining 
rates of average economic growth, respecting the 
3% of GDP reference value of the Treaty would 
no longer be sufficient to ensure a declining debt 
ratio. As a result of this, the legislative package 
proposes a numerical benchmark for sufficiently 
diminishing debt ratios. 
Still under the heading of fiscal surveillance, the 
package also encourages Member States to 
improve domestic fiscal frameworks. The 
rationale for this proposal is simple: as evidenced 
by past experience, the enforcement of EU fiscal 
rules cannot be expected to derive only from EU 
rules. Domestic budgetary arrangements need to 
be consistent with the obligations under the Pact. 
The most important extension of EU economic 
governance implied by the Commission’s 
legislative package relates to the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances. It 
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addresses the most serious and particularly bitter 
lesson of the crisis – a lesson for the economic 
profession as a whole – namely that fiscal 
discipline, coupled with low and stable inflation, 
is not sufficient to guarantee overall macro-
financial stability. Countries nominally strong on 
the fiscal side, but experiencing persistent 
external imbalances have been victims of the 
financial crisis. In turn, macroeconomic 
imbalances, financial instabilities and budgetary 
weakness have given rise to a negative feedback 
loop that has aggravated the initial shock. 
The new surveillance framework mapped out in 
the package aims at detecting, as early as 
possible, macroeconomic imbalances so as to 
allow a timely formulation of corrective policies. 
Finally, the package encompasses a new battery of 
graduated sanctions that are meant to strengthen 
the enforcement of the commonly agreed rules. 
Past experience clearly showed that peer pressure 
and moral suasion, although important, are not 
sufficient to ensure compliance. Moreover, the 
degree of deterrence of existing sanctions, those 
under the corrective arm of the SGP, was low 
because they can kick in only at the very end of 
the surveillance procedure. 
A robust crisis resolution mechanism 
Although significant, the Commission’s reform 
package of 29 September 2010 does not exhaust 
the EU efforts to strengthen EU economic 
governance. The other important “building site” 
concerns the design and implementation of a 
robust crisis resolution mechanism. When 
Greece entered a sovereign debt crisis in spring 
2010, policy makers where faced with the choice 
between a) refusing to help the ailing country 
and risk a meltdown of financial markets in the 
euro area at large, or b) finding a way of 
providing financial assistance. In the early hours 
of 10 May 2010 the Council decided to go for 
the latter. 
The main difficulty lay in the fact that providing 
financial assistance is alien to the logic of existing 
provisions. A forceful implementation of the 
SGP in combination with the no-bail out clause 
of the Treaty was meant to prevent any 
sovereign debt crisis. Once the unthinkable 
eventually happened, the lack of provisions to 
deal with an outright crisis turned into a clear 
handicap. 
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and the European Financial Stability Mechanism 
(EFSM) were put in place as temporary 
instruments to fill the gap in the existing 
governance framework. The intention was and is 
to deploy them, if necessary, until 2013 – when 
they should be replaced by a permanent crisis 
resolution mechanism which will come under the 
name of European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
The main features of such a permanent 
mechanism were sketched out in the conclusions 
of the meeting of the Eurogroup on 
16 December 2010. The ESM will grant financial 
assistance to euro area Member States on the 
basis of a stringent economic and fiscal 
adjustment programme, including strict elements 
of conditionality. Loans provided by the ESM 
will enjoy preferred creditor status, junior only to 
IMF loans. Moreover, the assistance of the ESM 
will involve on a case-by-case basis the 
participation of private sector creditors, fully 
consistent with existing IMF rules. 
Will the reform work? 
In line with the responsibilities assigned by the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Council and the European 
Parliament are currently examining the 
Commission package of 29 September 2010 and 
considering amendments. The plan is to have the 
new framework turned into law by mid-2011. 
This target date has been confirmed by the 
ECOFIN Council on 17 December 2010. 
Implementation should be relatively expedite 
also for the ESM. It will be created via an 
amendment to the Treaty through the simplified 
revision procedure. In practice this means the 
national approval procedures could be 
completed by the end of 2012 and the new 
provision could enter into force on 
1 January 2013. 
Once entered into force, it will take a number of 
years before we will be able to form a solid 
judgement on the merits of the full governance 
reform. This notwithstanding, there are a 
number of elements which allow us already now 
to be sufficiently confident about the prospective 
effectiveness. 
bepa monthly brief 
December 2010- Issue 42 
4 
As regards macroeconomic surveillance, an alert 
mechanism based on a series of relevant 
macroeconomic variables (e.g. the current 
account balance, net foreign assets the real 
effective exchange rates house prices, the 
government debt ratio and private sector credit 
in % of GDP) would have signalled emerging 
imbalances in Spain and Ireland already in 2004, 
and even more clearly in 2007. 
Expectations about the effectiveness of stronger 
fiscal surveillance are equally sanguine. If the 
proposed approach of assessing expenditure 
developments vis-à-vis sustainable growth had 
been in place in the past, concerns about the 
viability of fiscal policy in some EU Member 
States would have been raised much earlier. This 
insight bodes well for the future. 
As regards crisis resolution, the ESM will 
complement the new framework of reinforced 
economic governance. It will, first, reduce the 
probability of a crisis arising in the future and, 
second, help us better cope with crises in case 
they occur. 
The actual performance of the new set of 
rules will, of course, depend on how Member 
States exercise their responsibility under the 
provisions of the Treaty. At the end of the 
day, the reform cannot obviate one of the 
pivotal features of EU economic governance, 
notably the willingness to confront European 
and global challenges together while 
preserving national sovereignty in fiscal, 
budgetary and macroeconomic matters. 
Unless we agree on a stronger centralisation 
of fiscal policy, a strong commitment by the 
Member States to abide by the rules remains 
key for the success of any EU economic 
governance framework. 
Surveillance
- Preventive arm of the SGP: principles of 
prudent fiscal policy making (amendment 
to Regulation (EC) 1466/97 )
- Corrective arm of SGP: benchmark for 
sufficiently diminishing debt ratio
(amendment to Regulation (EC) 1467/97)
- Minimum requirements of national fiscal 
frameworks (new draft directive)
Surveillance
New procedures for monitoring, 
preventing and correcting macro-
economic imbalances (new draft 
regulation)
Enforcement
New disincentives/sanctions in case of non-
compliance in preventive and corrective arm 
of SGP (new draft regulation)
Enforcement
New disincentives/sanctions in 
case of non-compliance with new 
macro surveillance procedure (new 
draft regulation).
Fiscal governance Macroeconomic governance 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the Commission reform proposals  
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During the past year many proposals for EMU 
reform have been put forward – by EU 
institutions, national politicians as well as 
academics. The focus of these proposals is the 
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
This reflects the mainstream view that the current 
crisis is mainly due to a lack of fiscal discipline. In 
addition, there is also a consensus that the large 
current account imbalances within the euro area 
have played an important role in propagating the 
crisis. Accordingly, the Commission and the Task 
Force led by Herman van Rompuy have made 
proposals for monitoring and avoiding “excessive 
imbalance positions”.  
While these reform efforts are certainly very 
useful, one has to ask whether they really are 
sufficient for preventing a repetition of the 
destabilising processes with which EMU is 
currently confronted. It is certainly true that in 
some countries, and especially in Greece, fiscal 
discipline has been insufficient. But one has also 
to recognise that until 2007 Ireland and Spain 
were regarded as hallmarks for fiscal rectitude. In 
these cases it was not excessive public deficits, 
but excessive private sector financial imbalances 
that have led to disaster – even though the need 
to bail out the financial system and to fund the 
high unemployment that was caused by the real 
sector distortions has now severely affected also 
the financial position of the public sector.  
In other words, as the current crisis has mainly 
originated from a financial market failure, even 
with the most stringent SGP and national debt 
brakes enshrined in the constitutions of all 
countries already at the start of EMU, the 
situation would hardly be much different today. 
In emergency situations – such as after the 
Lehman crisis or in May 2010 – each 
government would have overridden even the 
strictest rules prescribing fiscal discipline.  
Therefore, the current reform proposals look 
quite incomplete. One might argue that the 
excessive imbalance procedure could contribute 
to more financial sector stability – but one would 
also have to admit that this is a very indirect way 
of coping with this important task. If the failure 
of financial markets is at the heart of the matter, 
a more stable and sustainable EMU requires a 
comprehensive and tailor-made framework for 
financial stability.  
A unified banking supervision system 
Given the fact that hundreds of billions of euros 
are currently required to stabilise the financial 
system of the euro zone, the most important 
innovation is an integrated EMU banking supervisory 
system instead of 16 autonomous national 
supervisors. This would have obvious advantages 
compared with the status quo: 
With an integrated supervision all relevant 
microeconomic data for EMU banks would be made 
available to a single institution. This would make 
it possible for the supervisor to identify all 
financial links between the Member States and 
concentrations of lending to specific borrowers, 
sectors and regions. 
An EMU institution would be much more 
independent from national interest groups and 
politicians than a national supervisor. Thus, the 
problem of “regulatory capture” could be 
avoided or at least drastically reduced. Notably in 
the case of Ireland such influences seem to have 
played a major role.  
An EMU banking supervisory system should 
closely cooperate with the ECB. This would provide 
the ECB with microeconomic data that are 
useful for its assessment of the financial stability 
of the euro zone. The fact that central banks 
were not aware of the important role of special 
purpose vehicles until the financial crisis broke 
out shows the importance of the access to a 
microeconomic data base.  
On the other hand, the ECB could in return 
provide the macroeconomic input that is 
required for an effective macro-prudential 
supervision.  
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As a second major innovation, the ECB should 
be given responsibility for financial sector stability on 
top of its mandate for price stability. The 
experience of the last decade has shown that 
the ECB’s focus on price stability has been far 
too narrow. While it is true that its interest rate 
policy has achieved remarkable success in 
keeping the inflation rate below and close to 
2 percent, the ECB has obviously not fully 
realised the growing tensions within the 
financial sector of the euro zone. It is often 
argued that with the interest rate instrument it 
is difficult to target price stability and financial 
sector stability simultaneously. But if a central 
bank follows a Taylor rule, it can avoid that its 
interest rate policy creates an environment that 
is conducive to destabilising processes in the 
financial sector. The major advantage of a 
Taylor rule over the de facto inflation targeting 
of the ECB is that it provides valuable 
information about the neutral level of the real 
interest rate.  
In fact, the two pillar approach of the ECB 
provides already a very good analytical 
framework for this dual task. While the pillar of 
economic analysis is mainly useful for the 
identification of threats to price stability, the 
pillar of monetary analysis (especially credit 
market indicators) allows a diagnosis of excesses 
in the financial sector. In addition, with its bi-
annual Stability Reviews, the ECB is already 
analyzing threats to the stability of the financial 
sector of the euro zone. However, with its focus 
on the aggregate situation of the euro area, these 
reports are currently of limited use. In situations 
with strong financial imbalances among Member 
States, an analysis of the situation in the 
individual countries is much more valuable than 
a description of the whole area. As the ECB is 
already discussing the state of national budget 
balances, there is no reason why it should not 
also analyse the situation of national private 
sector financial balances. 
Of course, the ECB would not have the sole 
responsibility for financial sector stability: it 
would have to share it jointly with the EMU 
banking authority. With the two institutions ever 
more integrated, even a dual mandate would be 
conceivable.  
Overcoming fragmentation 
The recent reform proposals for better financial 
surveillance in Europe are only a partial 
substitute for such a tailor-made EMU solution. 
The European Banking Authority is mainly a 
standard setter which is not involved in the 
permanent supervision of banks. The European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) will have the task 
of monitoring the soundness of the whole 
financial system in the European Union. But 
with more than 60 participating institutions it is 
unlikely to become a very effective institution. In 
addition, it will only be provided with aggregate 
data. If the ESBR wants to obtain information 
on individual banks, it has to ask the national 
supervisors in a complicated process. And even 
if it identifies risks, the ESRB can only issue 
warnings and recommendations which are not 
binding for the country to which they are 
addressed. If a country does not agree with the 
ESRB’s recommendations and chooses not to 
act, the reasons for that must be “properly 
explained”. If the ESRB feels that the 
explanations are not convincing, it shall inform 
the Council of Ministers. 
To most observers the case for an EMU 
integrated banking supervision is not a very 
realistic option for the time being. In fact, in 
Germany the government has just recently given 
up its efforts to merge into a single entity the 
responsibilities for banking supervision that are 
currently shared by the Bundesbank and the 
Bafin. And even the modest proposal to establish 
an EMU credit register to which all bank loans 
exceeding 1 million euros have to be reported was 
not even discussed at the political level.  
Nevertheless, if one takes into account the large 
sums that are currently needed to keep the euro 
zone financial system afloat and the brutal 
consequences of these rescue packages for public 
finances and future generations, this cannot be 
the last word. In 2020 it will be awkward to 
explain to our children and grandchildren that 
because of deep-seated national interests we 
decided in 2011 to keep the financial supervision 
for the euro zone almost as fragmented and 
incomplete as it had been before the crisis.  
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When more than twenty years ago the process 
towards monetary union in Europe was set in 
motion, many economists warned that if a 
monetary union is to be sustainable, it should be 
embedded in a political union (including a fiscal 
union). These warnings were brushed aside by 
policymakers: monetary union was implemented 
in the euro zone, political union was seen as 
unnecessary. The rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact would ensure a coherent set of 
national fiscal policies. 
Until last year, when the ten-year anniversary was 
celebrated, policy-makers were st i l l 
congratulating themselves about the great 
success the euro zone had been. It has now 
become patently clear that the absence of a 
political union is the single most important cause 
of both the emergence of the crisis in the euro 
zone and the incapacity of European leaders to 
solve it. 
Such absence had the effect that almost all the 
instruments of economic policy were left in the 
hands of national governments while monetary 
policy was completely centralised. As a result, 
national governments were unrestrained in 
following national economic policies that 
contributed to wide divergences in business 
cycles and trends in competitiveness. These 
divergences, in turn, precipitated the crisis. 
Fired up 
When the crisis broke out, no institutions existed 
to deal with it. No significant mechanism of 
mutual financial support had been set up to deal 
with local financial crises. To use a metaphor: the 
euro zone was like a city with an elaborate fire 
code (the SGP) but no fire brigade. The official 
justification behind this glaring absence of a fire 
brigade was that the latter was unnecessary 
because there was a good fire code. 
When the fire erupted a fire brigade had to be set 
up. Much precious time was lost, however, 
because the overriding concern of some of the 
EU governments was not to extinguish the fire 
as quickly as possible but to punish those who 
had been responsible for it. No wonder the 
forces of contagion were set loose. 
While it will remain difficult to make significant 
steps towards political union, the question is why 
it appeared so difficult to set up a mechanism of 
mutual financial support. After all, creating a 
European Monetary Fund is far removed from a 
full political union. Yet this small step appeared 
to be extremely difficult to take. Why? The 
answer has to do with moral hazard. 
Moral hazard is a serious problem. The existence 
of mutual financial assistance is like an insurance 
and can lead governments to behave less 
responsibly in the knowledge that when 
problems arise, other governments will step in to 
provide support. Understandably, those who 
might be called upon to provide the support are 
less than enthusiastic to step into such an 
arrangement. 
Yet the moral hazard problem – however serious 
– has been given too much importance. As a 
result, it became very difficult to react in a timely 
fashion to the unfolding crisis. 
Hazardous acting – and thinking 
I see two reasons why “moral hazard thinking” 
became an obstacle. First, it led to wrong 
diagnoses. True, the Greek crisis fitted the moral 
hazard story. Past Greek governments had 
allowed government debts and deficits to 
balloon and, in addition, had lied about it. Giving 
financial support to such budgetary misbehavior 
was difficult to justify. 
The crises involving Ireland and Spain, however, 
were of a very different nature. It is difficult to 
argue that the governments of these countries 
had allowed their budgets deficits and debts to 
balloon expecting the other Member States to 
bail them out. In fact, prior to the crisis, these 
governments had been the best behaving ones in 
the euro zone. The explosion of private debt was 
3 Addressing fault lines in euro zone governance  
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responsible for the crisis in these countries, along 
with the fact that modern governments are 
forced to save the private sector when it tends to 
implode. Moral hazard had nothing to do with 
that. 
There is a second reason why “moral hazard 
thinking” was a bad guide for action during the 
crisis. There is a trade-off between concerns 
about moral hazard and concerns about 
contagion. This was obvious during the banking 
crisis in 2008. Clearly, bankers had acted 
irresponsibly. Yet when the crisis erupted, most 
governments set concerns about moral hazard 
aside and used billions of taxpayers’ money to 
save the banking system. They did this (rightly 
so) because they believed that the possibility of 
contagion was a far more serious problem at that 
moment, and that the banking system had to be 
saved. 
When the crisis erupted in Greece, however, 
concerns about contagion were insufficiently 
recognised, while those of moral hazard took 
center stage. As a result, there was much 
hesitation, if not unwillingness, to set up a 
system of financial support. Its absence allowed 
the forces of contagion to take over. 
Moral hazard thinking not only made it difficult 
to take decisions to solve the crisis – it also 
aggravated it. This is particularly the case with 
the decision taken at the October European 
Council to set up a sovereign debt default 
mechanism. The latter aims at forcing 
bondholders in times of crisis to accept haircuts 
or other devices reducing the value of their bond 
holdings. As soon as the decision was made, 
bondholders panicked and massively sold 
government bonds, thus triggering the most 
intense crisis the euro zone has experienced to 
date. 
This should not have come as a surprise. When 
the members of the euro zone solemnly 
announce that in times of payment difficulties 
they will devalue the government bonds (that’s 
what a haircut means), they introduce a 
speculative dynamics that risks making financial 
crises an endemic feature of the euro zone. 
Speculative dynamics become self-fulfilling: 
governments whose bonds are sold face a higher 
interest rate, which makes the service of their 
debt more difficult. This changes the cost-
benefit ratio of maintaining full debt service and 
increase the temptation to devalue the bonds 
(the haircut). Investors “smelling” this 
temptation intensify their selling of sovereign 
bonds, thereby increasing the cost-benefit ratio 
even further. One could not devise a more 
unstable mechanism for the euro zone. 
It is important to stress that this self-fulfilling 
speculative dynamics also leads to a self-fulfilling 
increase in default risk. When markets fear 
default of (say) Irish sovereign bonds, they sell 
these bonds and the interest rates increase. This 
happened recently when the interest rate on long 
term Irish government bonds increased to 9%, 
thus potentially leading to the conclusion that 
Ireland is insolvent. But would not Germany, 
too, be insolvent at the same rate? 
Common bonds  
The euro zone can only survive if steps are taken 
towards a political union. However, the really big 
ones (including a fiscal union) are unlikely to be 
taken in the foreseeable future. The only avenue 
that remains open is a series of small steps, and 
one is the creation of common Eurobonds. 
There are economic and financial arguments to 
issue common Eurobonds. Here I want to stress 
the psychological one. The crisis in the sovereign 
bond markets of the euro zone has now reached 
existential levels: each time doubts arise about 
one particular country’s sovereign debt, these 
turn into doubts about the future of the euro 
zone. 
Such existential doubts are extremely destructive. 
They have to be countered by action, not cheap 
talk. A common Eurobond issue is an 
institutional device whereby members commit 
themselves to provide financial assistance when 
one country experiences payment difficulties 
(with the necessary mutual control on good 
behavior). Financial markets today need this kind 
of action whereby governments tie their own 
hands and signal that they are serious when they 
say that they will not let the euro down. 
Without such commitment, markets will 
continue to doubt about the future of the euro 
zone, thereby subjecting it to continuous 
speculative crises. 
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Départs 
Jonas Condomines Béraud a regagné le 
Parlement européen à la fin de son détachement 
de quatre ans en tant que conseiller principal 
auprès du directeur général du BEPA à la 
Commission européenne. Avant son départ, 
Jonas a finalisé une étude portant sur une 
évaluation de la première année de la mise en 
œuvre du Traité de Lisbonne, que vous 
trouverez sur le site du BEPA. 
Maja Prelog quitte le Groupe européen d’éthique 
des sciences et des nouvelles technologies (GEE) 
du BEPA pour rejoindre la DG Traduction au 
Luxembourg. Le mandat de Matteo Bonifacio en 
tant qu’expert national dispatché auprès du 
BEPA vient à échéance le 31 décembre 2010. 
Nous les remercions pour leurs services et leurs 
souhaitons beaucoup de succès dans leurs 
nouveaux postes et leur avenir professionnel. 
Événements 
Le 2 décembre, des membres du BEPA et du 
Cabinet du Président ont reçu une délégation du 
département international du Parti Communiste 
chinois, en visite à Bruxelles. 
Un déjeuner de travail visant la promotion de 
l’harmonie entre les communautés juives et 
musulmanes a eu lieu le 6 décembre. Cette 
rencontre, qui a rassemblé des membres du 
BEPA, des directeurs généraux de la 
Commission européenne ainsi que des rabbins, 
des imams et autres chefs musulmans importants 
des Etats membres et des Etats-Unis, s’est 
déroulée autour d’un seul menu, symbole du 
rapprochement entre les communautés 
confessionnelles. 
Activités à venir 
A l’occasion du premier anniversaire de l’entrée 
en fonction de la Commission Barroso II, le 
BEPA, en collaboration avec le service juridique 
de la Commission et en coopération avec la 
Direction générale de l’éducation et de la culture, 
organise une conférence intitulée “Mettre en 
œuvre le traité de Lisbonne”, qui aura lieu à 
Bruxelles les 9-10 février 2011. L’objectif de 
l’événement est de débattre des implications 
potentielles de la mise en œuvre du nouveau 
traité pour le processus d’intégration 
européenne. Le président de la Commission José 
Manuel Barroso ouvrira la conférence avec un 
discours et le président de la Cour européenne 
de justice Vassilios Skouris clôturera l’événement 
avec ses remarques. 
Le 11 février, BEPA organise une réunion de 
réflexion sur la question de l’équité 
intergénérationnelle. Des débats seront organisés 
autour de quatre aspects et thèmes: 
premièrement, l’éducation, la santé et la 
protection sociale; d’autre part, la durabilité et 
l’efficacité des ressources; en troisième lieu, une 
gouvernance efficace; et, quatrièmement, une 
croissance intelligente, inclusive et durable. 
Publications 
Trois nouvelles publications – deux préparées 
par des membres du BEPA et une par un expert 
externe – viennent de sortir. L’étude rédigée par 
Jonas Condonimes Béraud et intitulée “Lisbon 
Treaty: Year I” traite des changements dans le 
processus décisionnel et dans la mise en place 
institutionnelle post-Lisbon, y compris les 
procédures budgétaires, l’extension du vote à la 
majorité qualifiée au sein du Conseil, la 
délégation des pouvoirs législatifs, le rôle des 
parlements nationaux, et l’initiative citoyenne 
européenne. L’article intitulé “Le Traité de 
L i s b o n n e  o u  l a  t e n t a t i o n  d e 
l’intergouvernemental ?” de Dusan Sidjanski, 
professeur émérite de l’Université de Genève, se 
focalise sur les nouveautés institutionnelles et la 
nécessité du maintien de l’équilibre entre les 
diverses institutions européennes. 
Compte tenu de la nouvelle stratégie de croissance 
en faveur d’une Europe inclusive et durable d’ici 
2020, l’étude intitulée “Empowering people, 
driving change: Social innovation in the European 
Union”, coordonnée par Agnès Hubert et rédigée 
avec la collaboration d’autres collègues du BEPA, 
porte sur de nouvelles manières de sortir les 
citoyens européens de la pauvreté et promouvoir la 
croissance et le bien-être, non seulement pour, 
mais aussi avec les citoyens. 
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